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ABSTRACT 
Recreational drug use, whether publicly acknowledged or privately hidden, has long been 
a common activity within human societies. Though this comes with serious hazards, it also 
produces benefits, which often go unrecognized. Given the current prohibitory policies, it is 
important to consider whether such use ought to be restricted. I will do just that, focusing on 
whether recreational drug use can be part of a reasonable conception of the good life, as well as 
whether restrictions constitute an infringement on freedom. I will argue that, in moderation, 
recreational drug use constitutes a positive good for a large group of people, and that 
criminalization places an unfair burden upon these people, which breaches the liberal principle of 
neutrality. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
The prohibition on drugs in the United States has put hundreds of thousands of citizens 
behind bars. In 2016, the Federal Bureau of Prisons indicated that of 181,075 total federal 
inmates, 83,982 were incarcerated on drug charges. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
208,000 of the 1,325,305 inmates in state prisons in 2014 were there on drug charges, of which 
47,400 were possession only (Carson, 2015, p. 30). In 2015, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration employed over 9,200 people (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2015). The 
sheer number of impacted persons provides sufficient reason to submit the drug policies to 
philosophical scrutiny.  
The most immediate question is whether or not there should be any kind of governmental 
apparatus for regulating drugs. In this paper, I will first note the lack of justificatory reasons 
underlying the modern policies, then argue that there could be at least some potential 
justification for state control, grounded in the harms drug use can cause to both users and others. 
However, using Michael Bishop’s “network theory” as a framework, I will also argue that 
recreational drug use can be partially constitutive of well-being. I will then proceed to rebut the 
commonly voiced protests that (a) drug use will inevitably be bad for physiological health and 
(b) that it necessarily constitutes a lack of virtue. For the latter rebuttal, I will use an Aristotelian 
framework. 
Following this, I will argue that any state attempting to act in accordance with the liberal 
principle of neutrality should focus its drug policy on harm reduction. Such states are supposed 
to act impartially towards reasonable conceptions of the good life, meaning that, if recreational 
use can indeed be part of such a conception, the activity ought not be prohibited. To make this 
argument, I will draw on Douglas Husak’s defense of a right to drug use and call for the 
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abandonment of the criminal framework as the attempted solution to drug-related problems. I 
will conclude by investigating the current policies as they relate to the new goals I present, 
providing a couple of sample cases for consideration. 
2 CURRENT POLICY: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
An historical analysis of the rise of drug prohibition in the U.S. does not yield an image 
of a set of clearly articulated ideals being applied to a variety of scientific data on the effects of 
drug consumption. Rather, it looks like politics as usual: the current policies appear to be 
haphazardly grounded in anything from broad misconceptions about the effects of drugs to 
purposefully directed racism. An example of the latter comes from the first drug law passed in 
the U.S., an 1875 ban on smokable opium in San Francisco (“The Opium Dens”, 1875). 
Manderson (1999) argues the specificity of such laws is due to the public conception that only 
Chinese immigrants smoked opium, while whites typically preferred drinkable opium tinctures 
[laudanum] (p. 181). Much later, the Reagan administration’s Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
(2015) placed one hundred times stronger penalties on crack cocaine than powder cocaine. While 
these policies were also arguably underscored by racism, they were partially sold to the public 
based on claims that crack was substantially more addictive and could lead to a variety of 
negative health effects not caused by powder cocaine, including serious birth defects. The only 
pharmacological difference between the two drugs is sodium bicarbonate (baking soda) and the 
mode of administration, smoking for crack, insufflating (“snorting”) for powder. Under the 
Obama administration, the disparity was (partially) addressed and crack penalties were reduced, 
such that they are now only eighteen times harsher than the punishments for possession and sale 
of powder cocaine (Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 2015).  
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Of course, facts about how the drug prohibition arose are only marginally important when 
determining whether they are good laws. Surely, it does not bode well if the goals of the policy-
makers were ill-conceived, but neither does it provide certainty that the laws are either good or 
bad. To make such a determination, we must turn to questions of principle. 
3 GOALS AND METHODS 
3.1 Reasons for Restriction of Drugs 
The positive question, “Why regulate drugs?” is asked with surprising infrequency in 
policy debates. Proponents of decriminalization are often prodded to give reasons for changing 
the laws, implying the default position is to continue the drug prohibition as is. However, this is 
the question that must be answered if the policies are to have any clear goals. 
I will assume the historical points just mentioned are bad reasons for engaging in a drug 
prohibition. Surely, though, better reasons can be offered. When bans are formed based on 
misconceptions about the health effects of drugs, for instance, the goals of the legislators 
(assuming they actually believe the data they present) are not inherently bad. The resultant laws 
are bad because they are based on inaccurate information. But the underlying idea appears to be 
that there are some kinds of dangers related to drug use and that prohibition might help protect 
citizens. This places the states interest in the matter in the realm of promoting public health.  
That recreational drug use constitutes a public health concern may seem 
straightforwardly obvious, but I will attempt to give the claim some backing. It is an empirical 
fact that recreational drug use sometimes harms users. These harms include but are not limited 
to: accidents while inebriated, acute overdose, addiction, and physiological and psychological 
damage from both short- and long-term use. In addition to these, recreational drug use sometimes 
leads to harm to others, including: accidents while inebriated, results of drug-induced aggression, 
4 
and the use of drugs to facilitate rape.1 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
reported 49,714 deaths related to drug use in the U.S. in 2014, as well as 30,722 deaths 
specifically related to alcohol2 use (Kochanek, Murphy, Xu, & Tejada-Vera, 2016, p. 12-13). In 
2011, the Drug Abuse Warning Network estimated that, from a total of over 125 million visits to 
hospital emergency departments in the U.S., more than 5 million were related to drugs, with 
about 2.5 million specifically involving drug misuse or abuse (Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration, 2013, p. 7-8). In 2011, the National Drug Intelligence Center 
estimated drug-related healthcare costs to be around $11,416,232,000, with additional economic 
costs from drug-related productivity loss at around $120,304,004,000 (p. ix). In 2015, 39,513 
diagnoses of HIV in the U.S. were attributed to needle sharing related to injection drug use 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). In light of the list of harms and these statistics, it 
should be clear recreational drug use constitutes a public health concern. I will continue on the 
assumption this point holds, and that it provides justification for state interest in drug regulation, 
though people with a variety of political leanings may deny the state ought to be involved in 
promoting public health. Anarchists and libertarians, for instance, might believe even a drug 
policy of harm-reduction constitutes overstepping by the state. For this paper, though, I will be 
assuming that concern for public health is within the bounds of legitimate state interests. 
3.2 Reasons for Caution in Drug Restrictions 
Since there are serious drug-related harms, and the state could just attempt to eradicate all 
drug use in a prohibitory fashion, I now want to present arguments for weaker restrictions, based 
                                                
1	  Throughout	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  repeatedly	  use	  the	  term	  “drug	  abuse.”	  By	  this,	  I	  will	  mean	  roughly	  patterns	  of	  
use	   likely	   to	   lead	   to	   some	  of	   these	  harms.	   I	  will	   defer	   to	   the	  DSM	   for	   the	  definition	   of	   “addiction”	   (though	  
“substance	  use	  disorder”	  is	  now	  preferred).	  
2	  By	  “drug,”	  I	  mean	  something	  like,	  “a	  chemical	  substance	  that,	  when	  consumed,	  modulates	  bodily	  structure	  
or	  function	  in	  some	  way,	  excluding	  nutrients	  considered	  to	  be	  related	  to	  normal	  functioning.”	  Though	  this	  is	  a	  
somewhat	  loose	  definition,	  alcohol	  is	  included	  as	  a	  drug	  within	  it.	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on the efficacy of the policies in relation to the goals, while also considering possible goods that 
can come from drugs. 
3.2.1 Drugs as medicine 
First, if the state’s interest in policing drugs is to minimize or eradicate the harms 
associated with drug use (versus simply lowering overall use rates), ideal policies should not 
yield overall negative effects on public health. One obvious way drug policy could damage 
public health is by restricting access to drugs with medicinal value. This means ideal policies 
would not do so.3 
3.2.2 Drug-related harms and criminal punishments 
What punishments may be imposed for breaches of laws is frequently considered a 
dissociable issue from the rightness of the policies themselves. However, if the goal of the 
policies is to reduce harms, then there should not be criminal punishments attached. Perhaps if 
punishing drug users was massively beneficial to society and minimally damaging to the users, it 
could be justifiable, at least on a utilitarian framework. But it could also be argued on the 
utilitarian view that the long-term incarceration of users who break laws, many of which have 
mandatory minimum sentences attached, produces more costs than benefits, especially for drugs 
that are not particularly dangerous. 
There are many problems with using utilitarian calculus here. For instance, there is no 
clear comparison between the harms constituted by fines, imprisonment, and other punitive 
measures and the kinds created directly by drug use, like physiological damage, overdose, and 
addiction. Due to discrepancies like these, it is difficult to tell whether criminal punishment 
                                                
3	  It	   is	   likely	   wholly	   uncontroversial	   that	   there	   should	   be	   no	   restriction	   on	   medicinal	   access	   to	   drugs,	   but	  
people	  may	  disagree	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  current	  laws	  actually	  fail	  in	  this	  aspect.	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  show	  at	  least	  
one	  case	  in	  which	  current	  policies	  prohibit	  a	  potentially	  therapeutic	  drug	  in	  the	  comparison	  cases	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  this	  paper.	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yields overall benefit or not. More importantly, even if criminalization did yield an overall 
positive outcome, it would fail to address the appropriate goals of drug policies. Imprisonment 
does not address either abuse or addiction.4 And so, even on a simple utilitarian framework, 
criminalization fails to minimize harms. If the appropriate end-goal of drug policy ought to be 
the reduction or elimination of drug-related problems, then the state reaction to breaches of the 
policies should also be tailored to that purpose. Additionally, beyond utilitarianism, if adults 
have a moral right to use drugs, as Douglas Husak claims, then a positive sum in this case would 
not even matter. I will consider this possibility in more detail shortly. 
3.2.3 Drugs and well-being 
I now want to consider the value of recreational drug use within the framework of well-
being presented by Mark Bishop in his book The Good Life, which he calls the “network theory.” 
Bishop considers a person to have attained well-being if they are situated within “positive causal 
networks” (PCNs). These PCNs consist of nodes that feed back into one another, in what Bishop 
sometimes refers to as “positive spirals.” The identity of these nodes, and the kinds of 
relationships connecting them, will differ by individual. Bishop (2015) outlines the theory as 
follows: 
A person high in well-being has positive emotions, attitudes, traits, and accomplishments 
that form an interlocking web of states that build and feed on each other. According to 
                                                
4	  In	   some	   studies	   of	   addiction	   using	   animal	   models,	   rodents	   are	   conditioned	   with	   a	   drug	   reward	   in	   a	  
particular	  place	  until	  they	  show	  preference	  for	  that	  place,	  constituting	  drug-­‐seeking	  behavior.	  They	  are	  then	  
restricted	   from	   drugs	   in	   both	   the	   conditioned	   place	   and	   a	   non-­‐conditioned	   place	   until	   the	   drug-­‐seeking	  
behavior	  is	  eliminated,	  evidenced	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  place	  preference.	  If	  they	  are	  then	  reintroduced	  to	  the	  drug,	  their	  
behavior	  will	  return	  in	  full,	  evidenced	  by	  their	  reinstated	  preference	  for	  the	  place	  associated	  with	  the	  drug.	  
For	   a	   review,	   see	   Sanchis-­‐Segura	   &	   Spanagel,	   2006,	   especially	   p.	   30-­‐32.	   Problems	   with	   animal	   models	   of	  
human	  disorders	   aside,	   the	   implication	   is	   that	   even	   if	   an	   addict	   leaves	   a	   drug-­‐associated	   environment	   and	  
gets	  clean	  elsewhere	  (in	  prison,	  for	  instance),	  their	  chance	  of	  relapse	  following	  a	  single	  usage	  after	  returning	  
to	  that	  same	  environment	  is	  very	  high.	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the network theory, the state of well-being is the state of being in (or, to use philosopher’s 
jargon, instantiating) a positive causal network. (p. 10) 
Bishop (2015) prefers his idea to other theories of well-being, such as hedonistic (p. 112-122) or 
Aristotelian (p. 138-146) theories because, according to him, it captures commonsense 
judgments just as well as the alternatives, while providing superior explanations of a variety of 
psychological study data. The general approach is pluralistic and inclusive; high levels of 
hedonic value might play a part in a PCN, as may a variety of character traits often extolled as 
virtue—these factors just fail to constitute well-being as a whole.  
Bishop does not have a definition of positivity with necessary and sufficient conditions, 
which might be clearly fulfilled in some cases and not in others. Rather, he provides something 
like an empirical framework with which one might practically differentiate the valences of causal 
networks: 
A homeostatically clustered network of feelings, emotions, attitudes, behaviors, traits, 
and accomplishments is positive (rather than negative or neutral) if it consists of 
relatively more of the following sorts of states: a. psychological states that feel good—
that have a positive hedonic tone; b. states (psychological or not) that when present in this 
network tend to bring about psychological states that have a positive hedonic tone; c. 
states that the agent values; d. states that the agent’s culture values. (Bishop, 2015, p. 41) 
One of the simplest PCNs that Bishop considers is what he calls the “happiness/success 
cycle,” in which happiness feeds into success, which feeds back into happiness. People with 
positive affects tend to experience more personal successes than others, and people who succeed 
tend to gain happiness from doing so (Bishop, 2015, p. 37). Happiness constitutes a hedonically 
positive psychological state (a in Bishop’s list of possibilities), while success is an 
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accomplishment that tends to bring about hedonically positive states (b). In addition, both states 
are more than likely valued by any given individual and their culture (c and d). This two-node 
network is an extreme oversimplification; Bishop readily admits any actual network would be far 
too complex to chart out. I mention it to illustrate the feedback nature of such networks 
generally, 
To tie the network theory in with a qualified defense of recreational drug use, I will claim 
use is not necessarily opposed to well-being, and may even be an important aspect in its 
development and maintenance, for some individuals. This is not to say drug use never inhibits or 
destroys well-being, just that it does not have to, in every situation. I do not want to ignore the 
very serious negative aspects of use. Drug use can constitute a node in the negative alternative to 
a PCN, in which it may feed into physiological and/or psychological harms, may damage 
interpersonal relationships, sap finances, lead to addiction, or worse.  
Take the case of Owen Flanagan, who became addicted to alcohol and benzodiazepines, 
which he consumed in conjunction to self-medicate for an anxiety disorder. In his article “What 
is it Like to Be an Addict?” Flanagan lays out poignantly the first-person experience of 
addiction. Though he began to use as an attempt to get away from his anxiety, over time he 
became hooked.  
I now spent most conscious, awake, time drinking, wanting to die. But afraid to die. 
When you’re dead you can’t use…The desire to live was not winning the battle over 
death. The overwhelming need—the pathological, unstoppable—need to use, was. Living 
was just a necessary condition of using. (Flanagan, 2011, p. 277)  
This, clearly, is not a description of someone instantiating well-being. But somebody 
could have the same kind of initial problem—overwhelming anxiety—while recognizing the 
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incapacity of drugs alone to provide a real cure. They could use some kind of drugs (possibly 
benzodiazepines, which are anxiolytics) as tools, or temporary boosts to set them in the right 
direction. If they have such tense nerves that they could never make it through the threshold of a 
psychologist’s office without taking some calming medication to ease their minds, such a drug 
might be their only real chance to begin on a path to healing.  
Though drugs have great potential in some areas of therapy, there are also possible 
benefits of drugs use that are neither medicinal nor therapeutic, but should still not be 
discounted. Recreational drug use is a valuable part of individual pursuits towards well-being, 
whenever it is feeding into positive, rather than negative, causal networks. Bishop (2015) writes, 
“[A] network’s causal drivers are those states that are part of the network that tend to establish, 
maintain, or strengthen the network” (p. 43). I think it is unnecessary to claim drug use could be 
a causal driver in a PCN. In fact, the policy claims that arise from the arguments here should be 
able to rest on a much weaker claim, that use is simply not detrimental to well-being, as use itself 
is divorceable from the harms related to the activity. However, I will try to give some support to 
the claim that recreational use frequently constitutes a positive good in people’s lives. 
 Although recreational usage of drugs has the potential to lead to unwanted craving, 
tolerance, dependence, addiction, and withdrawal, it also regularly feeds into positive traits and 
experiences. I want to leave aside the euphoria common to recreational drug consumption as 
relates to PCNs; that is, one might argue that drug use could constitute a node in a positive 
network simply because euphoria is a positive affect. However, I believe the euphoria requires a 
special kind of relationship with drugs if it is to be considered part of a PCN. The euphoria 
cannot be part of a network in which it feeds into addiction or abuse of drugs. Otherwise, it 
might be hedonically valuable, but would not constitute part of well-being. For recreational use 
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to do this, it must feed into other positive traits, experiences, attitudes, etc.—and, as I will argue, 
this requires it be done in moderation. 
Other factors than the raw feel can and should be cited as positive reasons for using drugs 
recreationally. Some people (and some whole cultures) use drugs for spiritual purposes, often as 
part of rituals.5 Others cite drug consumption as a helpful motivator for engaging in creative 
activities. In addition, some people claim to benefit from the increased sociality that arises from 
certain drugs’ disinhibitory factors (like empathogens and alcohol). All of these factors 
(spirituality, creativity, sociality) frequently constitute nodes in positive causal networks in 
people’s lives. 
4 WELL-BEING AND MODERATION 
Having now argued that recreational drug use can form a node in a PCN, I will rebut the 
counterarguments that drug use cannot truly be part of well-being because (a) it necessarily 
breeds physiological harms that cannot be mitigated in any way and/or (b) it necessarily 
constitutes a lack of virtue. In establishments where alcohol is served, one can be sure to 
occasionally hear someone say, “Pick your poison.” Though it is never meant to be taken 
literally, the phrase holds a hidden understanding: alcohol can be poisonous. But when people 
drink it knowingly, they do not do so purely from self-destructive urges fueled by a Freudian 
death drive. Humans have found it can be enjoyable to temporarily disturb regular organic 
functions with trace amounts of toxins, in order to induce altered states of consciousness. People 
have engaged in drug use, and alcohol consumption in particular, for thousands of years. Aside 
from drinking alcohol simply due to the lack of other sanitary liquids, recreational use has long 
                                                
5	  This	   kind	   of	   usage	   is	   often	   protected	   legally	   in	   the	  U.S.,	   like	   the	   use	   of	   peyote	   by	  members	   of	   the	  Native	  
American	  Church,	  though	  this	  may	  result	  in	  loss	  of	  unemployment	  benefits,	  cf.	  Employment	  Division	  v.	  Smith	  
(1990),	  494	  US	  872.	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been recorded.6 Alongside this, there seems to have always been a human predilection toward 
overuse and abuse. Since this has been so common throughout history, I will now engage in a 
brief discussion about appropriate habits of consumption from the standpoints of medicine and 
virtue. 
4.1 Moderation and medicine 
Drugs can do amazing things. They can heal, miraculously. Drugs can do terrible things. 
They can kill, instantly. But can either of these effects arise purely out of a drug’s identity, or are 
there other relevant factors? Would problems result from a person taking infinitesimal quantities 
of a harmful drug each day? If they consumed a single molecule of whatever substance is most 
toxic to humans, every single day, would it matter? The answer is straightforwardly negative. 
Paracelsus, the father of toxicology, provided an important observation five centuries ago: “All 
things are poison and nothing is without poison, only the dose permits something not to be 
poisonous.”7 It is a fairly simple concept. If people consume a sufficiently large amount of any 
substance, it can have detrimental health effects, whereas they will be totally unharmed if the 
quantity is low enough. Even with its frighteningly small 8  median lethal dose, imbibing 
individual particles of botulinum toxin (“Botox”) daily would likely yield no noticeable effect. 
This is certainly the case with substantially less toxic chemical compounds, including all 
Schedule I drugs.  
4.2 Moderation and virtue 
I have already argued that drug use constitutes a piece of positive causal networks (and 
thus well-being) in many people’s lives, using Bishop’s “network theory.” However, not 
                                                
6	  For	  an	  enjoyable	  example,	  see	  Plato’s	  Symposium.	  
7	  Often	  paraphrased	  as:	  “The	  dose	  makes	  the	  poison.”	  
8	  This	   is	  micrograms	   for	  most	   people.	   See	   Arnon	   SS	   et	   al.	   (2001).	   Botulinum	   toxin	   as	   a	   biological	  weapon:	  
Medical	  and	  public	  health	  management.	  The	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association,	  285(8),	  1059-­‐1070	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everyone will accept the theory. Hedonists should be partially assuaged by the discussion about 
medicine and moderation, since it shows drug use does not need to cause pains, and can often 
and easily cause pleasures. But I would like to also appeal to virtue theorists, who might be 
hesitant to accept drug use due to the possibility that any amount of use constitutes vice. To do 
so, I will investigate drug use within an Aristotelian framework. 
Using drugs for recreation is using them to gain pleasure. On an Aristotelian account, the 
virtue concerning appropriate dispositions towards pleasures and pains is temperance. Though 
the term is now frequently associated with total abstinence, due to nineteenth century social 
movements, temperance for the Greeks was a virtue of moderation. Aristotle identifies excessive 
indulgence as “licentious,” but has trouble identifying the relevant deficiency. He writes, 
“[C]ases of defective response to pleasures scarcely occur, and therefore people of this sort too 
have no name to describe them, but let us class them as insensible” (EN II.7, 1107b7-9, trans. 
Thomson). The term translated as “insensibility” is anaisthētos, a predecessor to our 
“anesthetized,” which brings to mind catatonic or unconscious persons. Aristotle says incredibly 
little about this deficiency, believing it to be very rare. Though he says nothing about drug use 
specifically, of course, it is not hard to extrapolate his thoughts on temperance to the current 
issue. 
Certain pleasures are necessarily experienced during life. Quenching thirst with drink and 
satisfying hunger with food are both pleasures that must be enjoyed, and with some regularity if 
one is to survive. Of such “natural” pleasures, Aristotle writes, “few people go wrong, and only 
in one way, in the direction of too much; because to eat or drink indiscriminately until one is full 
to bursting is to exceed in quantity one’s natural limit, since the natural desire is merely a 
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replenishment of the deficiency” (III.11, 1118b16-20). Drinking or eating too much could be 
considered licentious, but Aristotle does not see either as being particularly common: 
But with regard to particular pleasures many people go wrong in many ways. Some of 
those who are called ‘lovers’ of this or that go wrong in enjoying the wrong objects, 
others in enjoying things with abnormal intensity, or in the wrong way; and the licentious 
display excess in every form. They enjoy some things that it is wrong to enjoy, because 
they are odious; and where it is right to enjoy something, they enjoy it more than is right, 
or more than is normal. (III.11, 1118b22-28, emphasis added) 
What then can be said about drug use and temperance? One way a person could go wrong 
is by gaining an excess of pleasure from consumption (i.e. “enjoying things with abnormal 
intensity”). A self-aware individual exhibiting such a disposition towards drugs might even 
recognize it as dangerous, as something that could easily develop into an addiction.  
Interestingly, another of Aristotle’s descriptions of licentiousness sounds remarkably like 
a modern account of addiction: “the licentious man is so called for being unduly distressed by the 
absence of what is pleasant, or by abstinence from it. … he is so carried away by his desire that 
he chooses them before anything else” (III.11, 1118b30-1119a3). In this passage, Aristotle was 
almost certainly referring to psychical pains, arising in the form of powerful and unfulfilled 
urges. But the claim seems all the more accurate when considering how overindulgence can lead 
to physiological dependence. Withdrawals indicate excessive urges are not merely behavioral; 
the brain regulates in response to drug use to reinforce such longing.  
Of course, with a modern account of addiction, we might say a person is not as 
responsible for his or her actions as would be required to rightfully refer to his or her 
intemperance with moral condemnation—but even so, it can be said that their intense desires are 
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contradictory to their well-being, whether they can change them or not. And that is Aristotle’s 
concern anyways, the attainment of eudaimonia. It is important to recall, though, that 
Aristotelian virtues are a mean state, lying somewhere between a deficiency and an excess. To 
consider the deficiency contra licentiousness, take the following:  
Cases of deficiency in respect of pleasures, that is of enjoying them less than one ought, 
hardly occur; because such insensibility is subhuman. Even the lower animals 
discriminate between different foods, and enjoy some but not others. If there is any 
creature to whom nothing is pleasant and everything indifferent, he must be very far from 
being human; and because such a type hardly occurs, it has not secured itself a name. 
(III.11, 1119a6-11, emphasis added) 
In Aristotle’s thought, the lack of any appetite does not merely appear wrong, but 
freakish, inhuman. Note, too, he refers to enjoying certain pleasures “less than one ought,” 
meaning the failure to appreciate pleasure appropriately does, in fact, constitute a lack of virtue. 
While he says little about having improperly weak responses to pleasures, believing it 
incredibly rare, from what he does say, it seems a person could be considered intemperate in the 
deficient sense if they never had desire for food or drink. To consider it again within the general 
framework of virtue ethics, it seems highly likely eudaimonia is unattainable if one cannot find 
enjoyment in anything. For instance, though he does not say it, Aristotle would likely agree that 
a person who takes no pleasure from any kind of art is failing to exhibit virtue regarding 
pleasure. Even if aesthetic value were considered wholly subjective, so that we could not say 
failure to feel pleasure in response to any particular work is wrong, we might claim it is 
impossible to attain a genuine state of well-being without being moved by anything. To look at 
any painting, any sculpture, any architectural marvel, to listen to any music, to read any work of 
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literature, to watch any performance, and to feel nothing, ever, would seem to indicate a level of 
dysthymia that would be detrimental to well-being.   
Of course, consuming drugs for recreation is not the same as enjoying artwork, nor can 
pleasures from drug consumption be considered obviously appropriate in the way those from 
food and drink are—it is not necessary for survival to consume drugs for pleasure. Though 
Aristotle would say excessive interest in drug use would be wrong (again, “enjoying things with 
abnormal intensity”), another question remains: is the pleasure associated with drug use the 
wrong kind of pleasure to enjoy? Is it, in Aristotle’s terms, “odious”? There is a relevant passage 
to assist in this judgment, by providing some criteria: 
[S]uch pleasures as conduce to health and bodily fitness he [the temperate man] will try 
to secure with moderation and in the right way; and also all other pleasures that are not 
incompatible with these, or dishonourable or beyond his means. For the man who 
disregards these limitations sets too high a value on such pleasures; but the temperate 
man is not like that: he appreciates them as the right principle directs. (III.11, 1119a17-
21, emphasis added) 
Recreational drug use is not the kind of pleasure all people ought to enjoy; however, for 
many people, a moderate amount of recreational use is valuable. Disagreement with this point 
would require an illustration of how moderate recreational drug consumption, use that is 
explicitly compatible with health and bodily fitness, is somehow intrinsically dishonorable.  
The point about moderation is very important. It sits well with Paracelsus’ claim, but also 
with Aristotle, who provides this example to illustrate the importance of accounting for 
individual variation when judging temperance:  
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Supposing that ten pounds of food is a large and two pounds a small allowance for an 
athlete, it does not follow that the trainer will prescribe six pounds; for even this is 
perhaps too much or too little for the person who is to receive it – too little for Milo [the 
renowned wrestler] but too much for one who is only beginning to train. (II.6, 1106a37-
1106b4 p.40) 
Put simply: moderation is vital, not total abstinence. This a common thread throughout all 
of Aristotle’s ethics; the Golden Mean is a balance between extremes. Sitting amidst the 
dogmatic imposition of Nancy Reagan to “Just Say No” and the encouragement of rappers like 
Ice Cube towards reckless abandon9 can be found the philosophical, reflective equilibrium: know 
thyself, and know thy limits. 
5 WELL-BEING, LIBERAL NEUTRALITY, AND DRUG POLICY 
Now, having argued that recreational drug use is often a part of the positive causal 
networks that constitute well-being, and having rebutted counterarguments about use necessarily 
being problematic for health and for virtue, I will consider policy implications. Though medical 
value may provide stronger reasons for lessening restrictions, health is not the only value in life, 
and drugs can be used beneficially in non-medicinal capacities. It may hold more heft to say 
somebody should be allowed to access a drug if they will die without it than to say they ought to 
be allowed just because they think it is fun. But recreation is an important part of many positive 
causal networks, making it part of well-being.  
Though not endorsed universally, this seems to be a claim few would debate. According 
to 2013 and 2014 survey data, over half of the adult American population had consumed an 
alcoholic drink within a month of being asked, and over seventy percent had one within the year 
(Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2014). Though alcohol is 
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  “We	  don’t	  just	  say	  no,	  we’re	  too	  busy	  saying	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  (Jackson,	  1988).	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minimally regulated, the limitations that do exist seem to have been designed to address the 
harms associated with its use. People are not permitted to drive motor vehicles after drinking, 
and alcohol vendors are not allowed to sell to minors. The former makes sense because alcohol 
heavily impairs driving abilities, the latter because alcohol consumption by adolescents can stunt 
brain development. If, instead of these narrowly articulated rules, there were a law requiring 
mandatory minimum prison terms for any individual caught consuming any amount of alcohol, 
this regulation would appear blind to the relevant problems related to the specific drug, alcohol. 
If the state’s interest in regulating drugs is based on public health concerns, and harmless 
recreational drug use is considered by many to be part of a reasonable conception of the good 
life, then ideal drug policies should be narrowly tailored to mitigate the harms of drug use while 
leaving limited access for recreational purposes. If the state is supposed to be neutral towards 
reasonable conceptions of the good life, and some (any) people hold that recreational drug use 
constitutes part of a good life, then the state may be obligated to act neutrally towards drug use. 
This means it should not create an undue burden upon any person attempting to engage in what 
they consider a potentially life-fulfilling activity. 
Neutrality toward reasonable conceptions of the good life is not an aspect of all political 
positions, but it is common enough to review relevant implications at length. I will situate it 
within the liberal framework of Douglas Husak. Philosophers have been largely silent about drug 
prohibition; Husak is one of few who has spoken and published on the issue.10 He provides a 
defense of drug use in the liberal tradition, claiming people have a right to use drugs. This, he 
says, means drug use should not be made into a criminal activity by the law. Husak is not 
                                                
10	  In	   a	   speech	   in	   2014,	   Husak	   provided	   the	   following	   explanation	   on	   the	   general	   air	   of	   silence:	   “Why	   do	  
philosophers	  not	  have	  much	  to	  say	  here?	  Probably	  because	  the	  topic	  is	  so	  incredibly	  fact-­‐sensitive.	  If	  you’re	  
gonna	  say	  much	  about	  drugs,	  you’d	  better	  know	  a	   lot	  of	   facts,	  and	  philosophers,	  you	  know,	  are	  notoriously	  
allergic	  to	  facts”	  (Tulane	  University,	  5:57-­‐6:10).	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concerned whether or in what ways drugs should be regulated, as I am in this paper. He is 
preoccupied with decriminalization. Much of his writing is on the lack of reasons behind treating 
drug use as a specifically viable activity for prohibition: 
Suppose that a new food were discovered that was no more or less dangerous or subject 
to abuse than cocaine and had exactly the same side effects. The fact that this new 
substance is a food rather than a drug is not, I think, relevant to the decision about 
whether it should be prohibited. (Husak, 1992, p. 26) 
If drug use is to be considered dramatically different from the consumption of other 
substances, there needs to be a clear defining line. In the brain, sugar has been found to activate 
similar regions to many recreational drugs (Colantuoni, et al., 2001). High sugar intake can result 
in behavioral dependency comparable to that seen in drug addiction via alterations in the activity 
of the endogenous opioid system, and the secretion and functioning of endorphins (Colantuoni, 
et al., 2002). It has also been indicated in an MRI study that analogous neural circuits activate for 
food and drug cravings (Pelchat, Johnson, Chan, Valdez, & Ragland, 2004). Husak makes a 
similar point about recreational activities generally; if there were a recreational activity more 
dangerous and addictive than drug use, would it be of any real concern that the activity was drug-
free when considering appropriate legislation? 
Keeping in mind the lack of justification for treating drug use as a special activity, Husak 
provides three criteria that must be met for drugs to be legitimately banned (on paternalistic 
grounds): 
First, this drug would have to create significant harms to a great many persons who use it. 
Second, few persons would regard the use of this drug as especially significant in their 
19 
lives. Finally, attempts to minimize the health hazards of this drug below the tolerable 
threshold must be deemed unsuccessful. (Husak, 1992, p. 100) 
If we accept this schema but attempt to apply it to activities other than drug use, freedom 
appears increasingly relevant. Many dangerous recreational activities, such as skydiving, boxing, 
and motor vehicle racing, are allowed with minimal restrictions. The third condition is especially 
telling when considering freedom, as it implies criminal punishment for engaging in an activity 
ought to be the very last resort when handling social problem. Food additives are regulated, not 
banned. People are legally required to wear seat belts in cars, not universally denied the right to 
drive. Martial artists are made to use a variety of protective gear, not told to stop fighting 
altogether.  
Refusing to treat drug use as criminal does not preclude the existence of a regulatory 
body, assuming it is properly focused. But neutrality demands that lawmakers refrain from 
giving preference to any particular conceptions of the good life. Prohibition places an unfair 
burden on people whose conception of the good life includes moderate recreational drug use. 
These people have less freedom in their pursuit of happiness than those taking different routes to 
well-being. Prohibition and the attached criminal punishments are not merely ill-suited for 
addressing drug-related harms, they constitute an infringement upon freedom, via a breach of the 
liberal principle of neutrality. 
5.1 Policy implications and the current laws 
Though it might not be quite so clear when looking at the application of the current 
policies, the letter of the law does appear to be directed at minimizing these kinds of harms. 
Consider the guidelines for federal scheduling (Controlled Substances Act of 1970). 11 
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Comparing the factors listed in the guidelines, there are clear trends present across the board, 
based on relational properties. As the schedules ascend in number, the abuse potential drops 
(high, less, low) and acceptance for medical use in the U.S. grows (no accepted use, accepted use 
with restrictions, accepted use). It is almost the same for the likelihood of developing 
dependence (severe, moderate, low, limited), except the statement for Schedule I, which does not 
refer to dependence but turns instead to accepted safety of use under medical supervision.  
The principles underlying the scheduling guidelines can be easily articulated. Abuse and 
addiction12 should be fought. At the same time, no beneficial drugs should be regulated so 
strongly as to make them inaccessible to those who need them for medicinal purposes. While the 
basic ideas underlying scheduling appear to be in line with the appropriate goals of drug policy, 
this fails to be reflected in the implementation of the law. Some portions are properly tailored, 
but for drugs in the lowest schedules, the policies are prohibitory.  
If drug policies ought to focus on abuse and addiction, on harms associated with drug use 
and not use itself, then really there should be no criminal punishment for use, nor for simple 
possession. This point is further supported if drug use is part of a reasonable conception of the 
good life, as I have argued, since a neutral liberal state should not make potentially life-fulfilling 
activities into criminal acts. In cases of rape, murder, assault, or any violent crime, the act in 
itself is the problem, and thus is the thing prohibited. Drug abuse and addiction are very harmful, 
and it makes sense to want to fight against them. But these problems are complex and need to be 
addressed with specificity—they cannot be reduced to use or possession. There are a variety of 
tactics for reducing many problems surrounding drug abuse: equipping police with naloxone 
allows them to prevent deaths from opiate overdoses, opening clinics which provide clean 
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  The	   federal	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   do	   not	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   I	  will	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   own	   definition	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  and	  the	  DSM	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  of	  addiction/substance	  use	  disorder.	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needles for injecting drugs reduces the spread of diseases related to needle sharing (such as 
HIV), encouraging people who drink heavily to take B-vitamins might reduce their chances of 
developing brain damage13, the use of stomach pumps saves many people from death by alcohol 
overdose.  
None of these methods get to the base of the problem, as they will not lower the rates of 
abuse itself—but they can be incredibly beneficial for reducing harms. They ought to be a major 
part of the state’s focus. There are many factors, both social and psychological, contributing to 
the phenomenon of drug abuse, and reducing its prevalence is a difficult task. Addiction, too, is a 
complex, multi-faceted problem that will not have a simple solution. Yet one thing remains clear: 
imprisoning drug users, even tens of thousands of them, fails to specifically target either abuse or 
addiction. Perhaps abuse can be lessened through a regimen of educational campaigns consisting 
of facts and harm-reduction methods, rather than scare tactics, alongside treatment options for 
addicts such as rehabilitation centers. It might be useful to put grant money for drug research 
towards the development of new recreational drugs with similar psychoactive properties to those 
already commonly used, but less physiological risk and addictive potential. A longer-term 
project could be building an understanding of the kinds of cultural factors contributing to abuse 
and addiction and seeking to change them, as well as researching ways to treat the genetic side of 
addiction.  
6 OTHER HARMS 
Before concluding, since abuse and addiction are not the only drug-related harms, some 
of the others should be addressed. DUI is a leading cause of death in this country, with rates far 
higher than for overdose. The state has every reason to be concerned with this. Technological 
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  Wernicke’s	  encephalopathy/Karsakoff’s	  syndrome	  is	  a	  neurological	  disorder	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stems	  from	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  brain.	  
22 
advancements may soon provide a solution via self-driving cars, but for now there are measures 
that can be taken. While there is a right to use drugs, there is no such right to drive while heavily 
impaired, so the state is justified in its current prohibitory DUI policy. It may even be legitimate 
to enforce this policy with the strictness of current drug prohibition.14 Of course, appropriate 
tactics would have to take into consideration which states constitute serious driving impairment. 
Drunkenness certainly counts, but so does heavy sleep deprivation, whereas not all drugs hinder 
the capacity to operate vehicles. 
Unfortunately, there are even more harms related to drugs. If the drugs typically used for 
recreation were also commonly used in poisonings, it would be worth devoting part of this paper 
to the issue. They are not, though. But there is an incredibly heinous crime that is often 
facilitated by psychotropic drugs: sexual assault. This is common and vicious enough to deserve 
somber consideration during any discussion on drug regulation. Even if a right to recreationally 
consume drugs is recognized, it is still tempting to claim this right ought to be superseded in light 
of the immense danger of drugs falling into the hands of people who would use them for rape. I 
am sympathetic to this claim. It is only upon careful consideration that I have come to believe 
prohibition is still not the answer. Drugs can be used in beneficial ways, medicinally and 
recreationally, and criminalizing their manufacture, sale, and possession will prevent all possible 
good that may come from them.  
But this just means part of the state’s concern in regulation should be fighting the use of 
drugs in certain capacities. In fact, it might be a wise reallocation to take the funds currently 
spent enforcing the drug prohibition and directing them instead towards fighting sexual assault 
generally. Perhaps in the public schools, rather than using scare tactics to divert children away 
                                                
14	  It	  might	  even	  be	  acceptable	  to	  enforce	  mandatory	  minimums	  for	  the	  reckless	  endangerment	  of	  the	  lives	  of	  
citizens.	  And	  if	  not,	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  should	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  obvious	  such	  penalties	  are	  wrong	  for	  the	  current	  drug	  policies.	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from drug use, they should be educated about consent and motivated to speak up about sex 
crimes. Perhaps “America’s Public Enemy Number One”15 is not people trying to get high, nor 
even the very real and frightening threats of drug abuse and addiction, but rather the rape culture. 
Perhaps instead of a “War on Drugs,” the nation ought to be engaged in a “War on Rape.”  
As when addressing DUI, while considering drugs and rape, the variation in individual 
properties of different drugs should be taken into account. One of the most common drugs used 
to facilitate sexual assault is alcohol, now nearly unregulated. Meanwhile, there is a Schedule I 
drug which may provide solace to some victims who develop post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) from their traumas—and which fails to substantially impact driving abilities. 
Unfortunately, this drug is also sometimes used to facilitate sexual assault (drugs that 
substantially reduce inhibitions are the kinds typically used in this capacity). In conclusion, while 
keeping in mind the dangers but also the potential benefits, I want to compare these two drugs, in 
an attempt to drive home the depth of irrationality behind the current state of drug policy. 
7 BACKGROUND FOR COMPARISON CASES 
7.1 Ethanol 
Alcohol consumption can cause serious physiological damage to users. Heavy use (what I 
have referred to as abuse) can lead to brain lesions and liver damage. Alcohol is carcinogenic 
and a teratogen. It is highly addictive and the withdrawal syndrome is incredibly strong, 
sometimes leading to death. Harper (1998) reviewed pathological changes in the brains of 
alcoholics, finding reduced brain weight and volume, with the amount of atrophy corresponding 
to the rate and amount of lifetime alcohol consumption. In a review of neuroimaging and 
pathological studies, Kril & Halliday (1999) found abuse of ethanol leads to a decrease of both 
grey and white matter volumes, particularly in the frontal lobes. Harper & Matsumoto (2005) 
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noted analysis of MRI data shows the cognitive deficits in alcoholics relates to damage in non-
cortical regions, including the cerebellum, pons, and thalamus. 
Behaviorally, alcohol is known to increase aggression in users (Duke, Giancola, Morris, 
Holt, & Gunn, 2011), being implicated in over half all homicides and assaults (Advokat, 
Comaty, & Julien, 2014, p. 136). Alcohol also heavily impairs driving; according to the CDC, 
nearly a third of all traffic deaths in 2014 were due to alcohol (National Center for Statistics and 
Analysis, 2015). Alcohol has no documented therapeutic value, though it is not unhealthy in 
moderate doses, like a single glass of red wine in a sitting. 
7.2 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, “ecstasy”) 
MDMA is generally considered to be neurotoxic to serotonergic neurons in humans in a 
dose-dependent fashion (Hall & Henry, 2006; Win, et al., 2008; Gouzoulis-Mayfrank & 
Daumann, 2009) and may specifically damage the hippocampus (Hollander, et al., 2011). There 
is some behavioral evidence to support hippocampal damage (Wagner, Becker, Koester, 
Gouzoulis-Mayfrank, & Daumann, 2012), although there are also contradictory behavioral 
results (Halpern, et al., 2011). However, according to a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging 
research on MDMA neurotoxicity, moderate use has not been significantly correlated with either 
structural or functional brain damage (Mueller et al., 2016), illustrating the current state of 
debate over the extent of MDMA’s neurotoxicity.  
MDMA is hepatotoxic and can lead to acute hepatitis (Andreu, et al., 1998). Though this 
may spontaneously resolve in some cases (Fidler, Dhillon, Gertner, & Burroughs, 1996), 
possibly to full recovery (Guneysel, Onur, Akoglu, & Denizbasi, 2008). In rare cases, extreme 
measures are needed such as liver transplants (De Carlis, et al., 2001). MDMA does not impair 
driving (Bosker, et al., 2011).  
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MDMA-assisted psychotherapy has recently been studied, with positive results for the 
treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Mithoefer, Wagner, Mithoefer, Jerome, & 
Doblin, 2010; Mithoefer, et al., 2012; Oehen, Traber, Widmer, & Schnyder, 2012). It is 
important to note that these studies treat MDMA as a therapeutic tool. Rather than long-term, 
daily administration of a psychotropic drug—SSRIs, for instance, are commonly prescribed for 
patients with PTSD—in these studies patients took the drug only a few times, in medically 
supervised environments. They then underwent therapy after the drug effects had set in. It is also 
incredibly important to point out that the results do not indicate a difference barely over 
statistical significance. The ability of MDMA-assisted psychotherapy to treat PTSD is around 
three times as effective as psychotherapy alone. Considering how many people suffer from 
PTSD—soldiers, police, firefighters, victims of rape or domestic abuse—alongside the 
insufficiency of current methods to consistently yield psychological healing, it seems horribly 
wrong to deny a possible cure to people who need it. In fact, it seems downright criminal. 
8 CONCLUSION 
The example cases are to provide evidence that the current federal scheduling of 
substances fails to genuinely account for related harms. A full analysis of all legal and illicit 
drugs would be far beyond the scope of this paper. What is important in these examples is the 
following: alcohol is unscheduled while MDMA is Schedule I, even though alcohol is far more 
dangerous than MDMA, both directly, through physiological effects, and indirectly, in terms of 
behavioral changes like driving impairment and increased aggression. 
Criminalization has been tried for a long time, and has failed. This is largely because the 
policies have been formed without clearly articulated principles. A comprehensive drug policy 
grounded in a principle of harm reduction, the kind for which I have argued, would require 
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extensive analysis of possible harmful factors of all drugs. The separation of drugs into 
categories based on dangers would not be there to assign users of more dangerous drugs longer 
prison sentences. Instead, it would be to ensure the proliferation of honest information about 
these drugs, as well as increased research into the mitigation of related harms.  
Beyond state policy, there appears to be something about our culture that is driving 
people towards reckless behaviors regarding drugs. Harm reduction in terms of laws would be a 
great first step in addressing the problems related to drug use. However, complementary changes 
to the social and cultural structures might be necessary extensions of this project. Widespread 
misuse of drugs is bolstered by a variety of cultural influences, for instance the glorification of 
drug abuse in books, music, movies, and so on. Finding and removing the motivations that drive 
people towards the misuse of drugs would be an appropriate continuation of my project. This, 
unfortunately, is a far more complex issue than the one I have addressed. I do not have any well-
developed idea of how to find the root of the social problem of the misuse of drugs. For now, I 
will only claim that harm-reduction policies would be superior to the current ones, because the 
modern prohibition is an infringement upon rights, one which unfairly targets people with a 
particular conception of the good life, a life in which the engagement of moderate usage of 
recreational drugs constitutes part of a positive causal network that constitutes well-being. 
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A: Federal Scheduling Guidelines 
(1) Schedule I.— 
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse. 
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States. 
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical 
supervision. 
(2) Schedule II.— 
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse. 
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States or a currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions. 
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substances may lead to severe psychological or physical 
dependence. 
(3) Schedule III.— 
(A) The drug or other substance has a potential for abuse less than the drugs or other substances 
in schedules I and II. 
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States. 
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or 
high psychological dependence. 
(4) Schedule IV.— 
(A) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse relative to the drugs or other 
substances in schedule III. 
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States. 
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited physical dependence or 
psychological dependence relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule III. 
(5) Schedule V.— 
(A) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse relative to the drugs or other 
substances in schedule IV. 
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States. 
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited physical dependence or 
psychological dependence relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule IV. 
 
 
